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Abstract
People do not always have accurate metacognitive awareness of the conditions that lead to good source memory. In Experiment
1, participants studied words referring to bathroom and kitchen items that were either paired with an expected or unexpected
room as the source. Participants provided judgments of item and source learning after each item–source pair. In line with previous
studies, participants incorrectly predicted their memory to be better for expected than for unexpected sources. Here, we show that
this metamemory expectancy illusion generalizes to socially relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants played a prisoner’s
dilemma game with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who either cooperated or cheated. After each round
of the game, participants provided metamemory judgments about how well they were going to remember the partner’s face and
behavior. On average, participants predicted their source memory to be better for behaviors that were expected based on the facial
appearances of the partners. This stands in contrast to the established finding that veridical source memory is better for unex-
pected than expected information. Asking participants to provide metamemory judgments at encoding selectively enhanced
source memory for the expected information. These results are consistent with how schematic expectations affect source memory
and metamemory for nonsocial information, suggesting that both are governed by general rather than by domain-specific
principles. Differences between experiments may be linked to the fact that people may have special beliefs about memory for
social stimuli, such as the belief that cheaters are particularly memorable (Experiment 3).
Keywords Cheater detection . Source memory .Metacognition . Judgments of item learning . Judgments of source learning
When someone cheats on you, you may promise yourself to
remember it forever. If that cheater has the facial appearance
of a criminal, you may be particularly convinced that you will
never forget what this person has done to you. Memory for
another person’s behavior can be classified as source memory
(i.e., memory for the context in which the person has been
encountered; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
Metacognitive awareness of one’s own memory is crucial in
deciding what to study and when to terminate study (for
reviews, see Bjork, 1994; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell,
2013; Soderstrom, Yue, & Bjork, 2016). Therefore, you
may not put much effort into trying to memorize a person as
a cheater if you expect your cheater memory to be particularly
good. However, accurate memory predictions cannot be taken
for granted. In fact, people’s metamemory—which includes
their subjective beliefs and judgments about memory—is of-
ten dissociated from objective memory accuracy (e.g., Besken
&Mulligan, 2013, 2014; Karpicke, Butler, & Roediger, 2009;
Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Objective memory for cheating or
cooperative behavior is particularly good when the behavior is
unexpected (Bell & Buchner, 2012). Specifically, source
memory is enhanced when a cheater has a trustworthy facial
appearance (Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012; Mieth,
Bell, & Buchner, 2016). Such an expectancy violation effect
on source memory has been found for nonsocial stimuli as
well (Küppers & Bayen, 2014; Schaper, Kuhlmann, &
Bayen, 2019a, 2019b). However, people are not
metacognitively aware of this effect (Schaper et al., 2019a,
2019b). Instead, they are prone to a metamemory expectancy
illusion as they predict memory for schematically expected
information to be particularly good. The current research
serves to (a) replicate the metamemory illusion for nonsocial
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stimuli, and (b) test whether the metamemory expectancy il-
lusion generalizes to the social domain.
As yet, people’s metamemory beliefs about sourcememory
have only been examined using nonsocial stimuli.
Specifically, Schaper et al. (2019a, 2019b) showed partici-
pants words that referred to bathroom or kitchen items. The
items were either presented with their schematically expected
source (e.g., “oven in the kitchen”) or with an unexpected
source (e.g., “frying pan in the bathroom”). Participants pre-
dicted better item memory for items presented with expected
than with unexpected sources, but their veridical itemmemory
was unaffected by schematic expectancy. Importantly, partic-
ipants incorrectly predicted source memory to be better for
expected than for unexpected item–source pairs. However,
actual guessing-corrected source memory was better for un-
expected than for expected sources. Schaper et al. (2019a,
2019b) attributed this metamemory expectancy illusion to
global beliefs about the effects of relatedness on memory
(Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013) and to an increased
encoding fluency of the related item–source pairs (Undorf &
Erdfelder, 2011, 2013, 2015). People hold the global belief
that expected information is better remembered than is unex-
pected information (cf. Mueller et al., 2013; Schaper et al.,
2019b). Furthermore, expected information is more fluently
processed than unexpected information (Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Enhanced
processing fluency at encoding in turn is associated with
higher metamemory judgments. Ironically, veridical memory
is often better for material that is more difficult to process
because it requires more elaboration (e.g., Besken &
Mulligan, 2013; Bjork, 1994; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Yue,
Castel, & Bjork, 2013). In source memory, people seem to fall
prone to a metamemory illusion in that they systematically
overestimate source memory for expected compared with un-
expected sources (Schaper et al., 2019a, 2019b).
However, Schaper et al. (2019a, 2019b) used stimulus ma-
terial of low social and emotional relevance. People thus may
simply lack metamemory awareness in situations where accu-
racy is of little importance. Obviously, the ultimate goal of
such research is not to specifically understand how people
remember bathroom and kitchen items. Rather, we want to
gain general insights into how expectations affect judgments
of source learning and source memory. Although such gener-
alizations are a necessary part of theorizing, they may repre-
sent dangerous simplifications. In a worst-case scenario, find-
ings may fail to generalize beyond the specific type of material
used in the original study.
Evolutionary psychology, in particular, criticizes mainstream
psychology for postulating general-purposemechanisms that can
be applied to any kind of stimulus material independent of its
specific type of content (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The
present study serves to test whether themetamemory illusion can
be obtained with stimulus material of higher evolutionary
relevance. Specifically, we examined how well participants re-
membered the cheating or cooperative behavior of their partners
in a prisoner’s dilemma game with real financial consequences.
Successful reciprocal cooperation requires accurate memory for
the cheating and cooperative behavior of others (Schaper, Mieth,
& Bell, 2019). A great degree of precision in cheater detection is
required: Cheating must not go unnoticed (Cosmides & Tooby,
1992). To achieve a high level of precision, people must be able
to adaptively adjust their encoding resources to different situa-
tional demands (Kroneisen, Woehe, & Rausch, 2015). From an
evolutionary perspective, metacognition is assumed to have
evolved in humans because metacognitive reflections can be
put to use in controlling how new information is encoded, what
information is retrieved, how problems are solved, and how one
interacts with other people (Metcalfe, 2008). Importantly, evolu-
tionary psychology traditionally implies that important adaptive
problems are dealt with by highly specialized cognitive modules
that are specifically tailored to the requirements of these—
narrowly defined—problems (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005).
From these presumptions, the hypothesis can be derived that
metacognition for social-exchange relevant information might
be “special” in that it should be more accurate and less suscepti-
ble to illusions.
The present research provides an empirical test of whether
the metamemory illusion generalizes to a paradigm with high
social and emotional relevance. As a first step, we replicated
the metamemory illusion using the same nonsocial material as
Schaper et al. (2019a). In Experiment 1, bathroom items (e.g.,
a toothbrush) and kitchen items (e.g., an oven) were paired
with the expected or unexpected source (“kitchen” or “bath-
room”). Judgments of item learning (Rhodes, 2016) and judg-
ments of source learning (Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016) were
assessed after each item–source pair had been encoded. In a
following source monitoring test, we assessed how well par-
ticipants recognized bathroom and kitchen items and howwell
they remembered the items’ sources. In Experiment 2, by
contrast, trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking
faces were paired with cheating or cooperative behaviors in
a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with real financial con-
sequences (cf. Bell et al., 2012; Mieth et al., 2016). This par-
adigmwas structurally similar to that of Experiment 1 because
the item information (e.g., a trustworthy-looking face) was
paired with expected (e.g., cooperation) or unexpected (e.g.,
cheating) source information. Immediately after each round of
the prisoner’s dilemma game, participants provided a judg-
ment of item learning for the face and a judgment of source
learning for the behavior. In a memory test, we assessed how
well participants recognized the faces (item memory) and re-
membered the association between the faces and the cheating
or cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game
(source memory).
We expected to replicate the metamemory illusion in source
memory for nonsocial material (Schaper et al., 2019a, 2019b) in
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Experiment 1. The novel contribution of Experiment 2 is that we
assessed metamemory judgments for item and source learning in
the prisoner’s dilemma game. If metamemory judgments about
social source memory are governed by the same principles as
those about nonsocial source memory, people should show a
metacognitive illusion. That is, they should predict source mem-
ory to be better for socially expected behaviors (e.g., a
trustworthy-looking person cooperating) than for unexpected be-
haviors (e.g., a trustworthy-looking person cheating), due to the
increased fluency associated with the processing of expected
information and/or global beliefs that expected information is
easier to remember (Schaper et al., 2019a, 2019b). Following
Schaper et al. (2019a), we compared source memory between
participants who provided the metamemory judgments and
participants who did not provide any metamemory judgments
during encoding, to test whether veridical memory is affected
by the metamemory judgments. Schaper et al. (2019a) found
the expectancy violation effect on source memory to be de-
creased when participants made metamemory predictions at
encoding. Participants may elaborate on the relationship between
the item and the expected source when making metamemory
judgments, which selectively increases memory for expected in-
formation (Soderstrom, Clark, Halamish, & Bjork, 2015). If so-
cial sourcememory is equally affected bymetacognitive process-
ing as is nonsocial source memory, the source memory advan-
tage for trustworthy-looking cheaters should decrease when
metamemory judgments are provided. Following the procedure
of Schaper et al. (2019a), we also assessed participants’
postdictions of their item and source memory after the memory
test. These global judgments reflect the participants’ retrospective
assessment of their memory for the different item–source com-
binations in the memory test. In Experiment 1, these postdictions
should replicate the findings of Schaper et al. (2019a). In
Experiment 2, they give us further insights about retrospective
metamemory judgments concerning cheating and cooperative
behaviors after the actual encoding episode and memory test.
Experiment 3 complements Experiment 2 by providing insights
about people’s beliefs about memory for cheaters and coopera-
tors. Beliefs are global judgments about memory in the absence
of first-hand experience with the specific stimulus material about
which the judgments are made.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Up to nine participants were tested simultaneously in individ-
ual cubicles. We collected as much data as possible in the 4
weeks the laboratory was available to us. A total of 120 par-
ticipants (75 female) were recruited on campus at Heinrich
Heine University Düsseldorf. They were compensated with
course credit or money. Upon arrival, participants were
alternatingly assigned to one of two groups. The 60 partici-
pants (34 female) in the with-judgment group provided
metamemory judgments at encoding, while the 60 participants
(41 female) in the without-judgment group did not. Age
ranged between 18 and 39 years (Mage = 24 years, SDage = 4
years). All participants gave written informed consent in ac-
cordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
A sensitivity power analysis calculated with G*Power
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that with
a sample size of 120 participants (60 per group), 96 answers
per participant in the memory test, and given α = .05, effect
sizes of w = 0.05 (small effects) could be detected in the
goodness-of-fit test of the model with a statistical power of 1
− β = .95.
Materials
Materials were identical to those used by Schaper et al.
(2019a). Items were highly expected for one room and highly
unexpected for the other room. The 96 items were split into
three lists, each consisting of 16 bathroom and 16 kitchen
items. During encoding, items from one list were presented
with the kitchen source, and items from the other list were
presented with the bathroom source so that 32 items were
paired with the expected source and 32 items were paired with
the unexpected source. The items of the third list were used as
distractors during the memory test. Across participants, all
three lists were presented equally often with the kitchen, with
the bathroom, and as distractors.
Encoding phase
The procedure (including the counterbalancing scheme) was
largely identical to that used by Schaper et al. (2019a).
However, a few adjustments were made to make the experi-
ment more similar to the experiment using social stimulus ma-
terial (Experiment 2). Prior to encoding, the memory test was
not mentioned in the written instructions (other than in Schaper
et al., 2019a). The encoding phase started with two buffer items
(one in the kitchen, one in the bathroom) which were equally
expected for both rooms. These buffer trials served to familiar-
ize the participants with the procedure. Then the 64 items were
presented in randomized order. Each trial started with the pre-
sentation of an item at the center of the screen. The item (with-
out source information) was presented in white letters in stan-
dard German capitalization on a black background. In Schaper
et al. (2019a), items and source information had been presented
simultaneously. In the present experiment, by contrast, source
information was shown only after a button press to make the
procedure more similar to that of Experiment 2 reported here.
Directly below the item, a button with the label “Where?” was
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presented. Upon clicking this button, participants were in-
formed about whether this item was found “in the
KITCHEN” or “in the BATHROOM” (rooms in capital
letters).
Judgments of item and source learning
Metamemory judgments were assessed as in Schaper et al.
(2019a). Participants in the with-judgments group were first
asked to predict the probability that they would later remem-
ber the item (judgment of item learning). Specifically, they
were asked, “How likely is it that you will later remember this
item?” After that, a different screen appeared, and participants
were asked to predict the probability that they would later
remember the room in which the item was placed (judgment
of source learning). Specifically, they were asked, “Provided
that you remember this item, how likely is it that you will
remember the room (kitchen or bathroom) in which this item
was placed?” Each questionwas displayed in the middle of the
screen, with items and sources no longer visible. Judgments
were assessed on a continuous scale from 0% (“I will definite-
ly not remember this”) to 100% (“I will definitely remember
this”). Judgments were typed into a text field using the number
pad of the keyboard. Participants were allowed to correct their
responses. To make the judgments more discriminable, a dif-
ferent background color was used for the judgment of item
learning and the judgment of source learning (blue or yellow,
randomized between participants). Participants in the without-
judgments group did not provide these judgments.
Source monitoring test
After encoding, participants received instructions for the
memory test. A standard source monitoring test was applied
that was identical to that used in previous studies (Schaper
et al., 2019a, 2019b). The 64 items from the encoding phase
were randomly intermixed with the 32 new (16 bathroom, 16
kitchen) items. The items were presented, one at a time, in
random order at the center of the screen. For each item, par-
ticipants indicated, by clicking on one of two response but-
tons, whether or not they had seen the item during encoding. If
so, they further indicated whether the item had been presented
in the kitchen or in the bathroom. Then the next trial started.
Measuring source memory
When measuring source memory, it is important to disentan-
gle source memory, item memory, and guessing processes
(Bröder & Meiser, 2007). To this end, we used the multino-
mial source monitoring model (Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder,
1996). The model in Fig. 1 has been successfully validated
and applied in many previous studies (Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011; Bell et al., 2012; Kroneisen et al., 2015; Kuhlmann,
Vaterrodt, & Bayen, 2012; Küppers & Bayen, 2014). The
parameters are probabilities that vary between zero and one.
The three trees of the model represent the different types of
items presented in the memory test. Participants saw old items
that had either been presented in the kitchen or in the bath-
room and new items. The first tree represents the processes
that occur in response to Source A items in the memory test. In
the present experiment, Source A stands for the kitchen
source, and Source B stands for the bathroom source. With
probability DA, participants recognize the item as old. With
the conditional probability dA, participants also have source
memory (and thus remember that the item was presented in
the kitchen). When participants have no source memory (with
probability 1 − dA), they have to guess with probability g that
the item was presented in Source A (the kitchen) or with the
complementary probability 1 − g that the item was presented
in Source B (in the bathroom). When participants do not rec-
ognize the item with probability 1 − DA, they guess with
probability b that the item is old and have to guess with prob-
ability g that the item was presented in Source A and with 1 −
g that the item was presented in Source B. Alternatively, par-
ticipants guess that the item is new with probability 1 − b.
Response frequencies from the memory test are used to esti-
mate the parameters for item memory (D), item guessing (b),
source memory (d), and source guessing (g). For the current
study, four sets of model trees were needed for each combi-
nation of item type (bathroom items and kitchen items) and
judgment group (without judgments and with judgments).
Postdictions
After the memory test, participants provided postdictions
(Schaper et al., 2019a), which are aggregated judgments of
item memory and source memory. Postdictions were assessed
for all four item type (bathroom items and kitchen items) ×
source type (in the kitchen and in the bathroom) combinations.
The order of the postdictions was randomized with the restric-
tion that the item-memory postdictions for a given item type ×
source type combination (e.g., “How likely was it that you
have remembered the kitchen-typical items that were placed
in the bathroom? [Remembering here only means that you
have remembered having seen the item; it does not matter
whether you also have correctly remembered the room in
which it was placed.]”) were always immediately followed
by the corresponding source-memory postdictions for that
combination (e.g., “Staying with kitchen-typical items that
were placed in the bathroom: For what percentage of those
items that you have recognized did you correctly remember
that they were placed in the bathroom?”). The rating scale
ranged from 0% (“I have definitely not remembered this”) to
100% (“I have definitely remembered this”). Answers were
typed into a text field using the number pad of the keyboard.
Participants were allowed to correct their responses.
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Design
We used a 2 × 2 × 2 design with item type (bathroom items vs.
kitchen items) and source type (in the kitchen vs. in the bath-
room) as within-subject factors and judgment group (without-
judgments vs. with-judgments) as between-subjects factor.
Dependent variables were metamemory judgments (judg-
ments of item and source learning) averaged across items,
objective memory (item and source memory), guessing, and
postdictions (of item and source memory).
Results
Metamemory judgments were analyzed with repeated-
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Source monitor-
ing processes were analyzed with the multinomial model
shown in Fig. 1. Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit tests
were calculated with multiTree (Moshagen, 2010).1 All
analyses use significance levels of .05, except for the supple-
mentary analyses following up on the significant interactions,
which use a Bonferroni-corrected significance level of .025.
Judgments of item and source learning
In the with-judgments group, judgments of item learning were
influenced by item type, F(1, 59) = 17.71, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.23,
but not by source type, F(1, 59) = 0.97, p = .330, ηp
2= 0.02.
There was an interaction between item type and source type,
F(1, 59) = 26.57, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.31 (see Fig. 2a). On aver-
age, participants predicted better item memory for bathroom
items presented in the bathroom than for bathroom items in
the kitchen, F(1, 59) = 17.88, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.23, and for
Fig. 1 Multinomial model of source memory, adapted from Bayen et al.
(1996). Rounded rectangles on the left (A, B, and New) represent the
items that were shown in the memory test (items that were placed in the
kitchen, items that were placed in the bathroom, and new items in
Experiment 1, and cheater, cooperator, or new faces in Experiment 2).
The letters along the branches represent the probabilities with which
certain memory states occur (D: probability of recognizing an old item
as old and a new item as new; d: conditional probability of remembering
whether an old item was associated with Source A or Source B; g:
conditional probability of guessing that the item was associated with
Source A rather than with Source B; b: conditional probability of
guessing that an item was old rather than new). Rectangles on the right
reflect the participants’ answers in the memory test
1 We also performed supplementary hierarchical Bayesian analyses for
Experiments 1 and 2 with TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018) that take individual
variability into account, which confirmed the results based on the aggregated
data.
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kitchen items in the kitchen than for kitchen items in the bath-
room, F(1, 59) = 28.98, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.33.
Judgments of source learning were also influenced by item
type, F(1, 59) = 5.64, p = .021, ηp
2= 0.09, but not by source
type, F(1, 59) < 0.01, p = .962, ηp
2< 0.01. Critically, there was
an interaction between item type and source type, F(1, 59) =
68.30, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.54. On average, participants predicted
better source memory for bathroom items in the bathroom
than for bathroom items in the kitchen, F(1, 59) = 62.09, p <
.001, ηp
2= 0.51, and for kitchen items in the kitchen than for
kitchen items in the bathroom,F(1, 59) = 66.47, p < .001, ηp
2=
0.53 (see Fig. 2b). Thus, participants predicted better item and
source memory for expected pairings than for unexpected
pairings.
Item and source memory
Two-high threshold models (Bayen et al., 1996; Snodgrass &
Corwin, 1988) commonly imply that item memory does not
differ between old and new items to obtain identifiability.
Therefore, we incorporated the restriction DA = DB = DNew
into the model displayed in Fig. 1. This restriction also implies
that item memory does not differ between items presented in
the kitchen and items presented in the bathroom, which was
supported by a repeated-measures ANOVA performed on the
corrected hit rate for item memory (given by hit rate minus
false alarm rate; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) of the present
experiment. The base model including these restrictions was
compatible with the data,G2(4) = 3.71, p = .446. There was no
Fig. 2 Judgments of item learning (a, c) and judgments of source learning
(b, d) as a function of the item type (bathroom items vs. kitchen items)
and source type (in the kitchen vs. in the bathroom) in Experiment 1 (left
panels) or as a function of the partner’s facial trustworthiness (trustworthy
vs. untrustworthy) and the partner’s behavior (cheating vs. cooperation)
in Experiment 2 (right panels). Error bars represent the standard errors of
the means
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difference in item memory between bathroom and kitchen
items, ΔG2(2) = 2.80 p = .247, w = 0.02 (see Fig. 3a).
However, participants in the with-judgments group showed
better item memory than participants in the without-
judgments group, ΔG2(2) = 124.37 p < .001, w = 0.10.
Consistent with previous studies (Rhodes, 2016; Schaper
et al., 2019a), the requirement to invest processing resources
and time into the metacognitive judgments benefitted item
memory.
Source-memory parameter d represents the conditional
probability that the room in which an item was placed was
successfully remembered, provided that the item had been
recognized as old. Following the procedure of Schaper et al.
(2019a), we started the analysis by equating the two parame-
ters representing source memory for expected item–source
pairings, as well as the two parameters representing source
memory for unexpected item source pairings. The resulting
model provided a satisfactory fit to the data, G2(8) = 11.68,
p = .166, so that it was used as the new base model for the
subsequent comparisons of the source memory parameters
(see Erdfelder et al., 2009). As in the study of Schaper et al.
(2019a), participants in the without-judgments group showed
an expectancy violation effect. Their source memory was
better for unexpected item–source pairings than for expected
item–source pairings,ΔG2(1) = 3.96, p = .047, w = 0.02 (left
side of Fig. 3b). By contrast, participants in the with-judgment
group did not show such an expectancy violation effect. Their
sourcememory did not differ between unexpected and expect-
ed item–source pairings, ΔG2(1) = 0.49, p = .483, w < 0.01
(right side of Fig. 3b). However, a direct comparison of the
parameters reflecting source memory of expected and unex-
pected pairs across groups did not support that sourcememory
differed significantly between groups, ΔG2(2) = 3.96, p =
.138, w = 0.02. At a descriptive level, these findings are con-
sistent with those of previous studies showing that
metamemory judgments selectively enhance memory for ex-
pected information (Schaper et al., 2019a; Soderstrom et al.,
2015), but this difference was not substantiated by the model-
based test.
Source guessing parameters are reported in Table 1. When
participants did not remember in which room an item was
placed, they had to guess whether it was placed in the kitchen
or in the bathroom. Parameter g (reflecting the probability of
guessing that an item was placed in the kitchen) differed sig-
nificantly between bathroom and kitchen items, independent
of whether participants provided metamemory judgments,
Fig. 3 Parameter estimates for the item memory parameter D (a, c) and
source memory parameter d (b, d) as a function of the item type
(bathroom vs. kitchen) and source type (in the kitchen vs. in the
bathroom) in Experiment 1 (left panels) and as a function of the
partners’ facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and the
partners’ behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) in Experiment 2 (right
panels). The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
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ΔG2 (1) = 8.02, p = .005, w = 0.03, or not,ΔG2(1) = 14.36, p
< .001,w = 0.04. This provides evidence of a schematic guess-
ing bias in both groups.
Postdictions of item and source memory
After the memory test, participants in both groups provided
postdictions (aggregated judgments about item and source
memory) for all four combinations of the design. Data of 18
participants were incomplete and had to be excluded from this
analysis. Postdictions for item and source memory are report-
ed in Figs. 4a–b. In the analysis of the postdictions of item
memory, there was neither a main effect of item type nor a
main effect of source type. Both variables did not significantly
interact with judgment group (all Fs ≤ 0.48). The interaction
between item type and source type was significant.
Participants thought they had remembered items with expect-
ed sources better than items with unexpected sources, F(1,
100) = 6.08, p = .015, ηp
2= 0.06. However, a three-way inter-
action, F(1, 100) = 5.14, p = .026, ηp
2= 0.05, reflected the fact
that this expectancy illusion was only present in the with-
judgments group, F(1, 50) = 9.73, p = .003, ηp
2= 0.16, but
not in the without-judgments group, F(1, 50) = 0.02, p = .880,
ηp
2< 0.01.
Similar results were obtained for the postdictions of source
memory. There was neither a main effect of item type nor a
main effect of source type. Both variables did not significantly
interact with judgment group (all Fs ≤ 0.81). There was an
interaction between item type and source type. Participants
thought they had remembered expected sources better than
unexpected sources, F(1, 100) = 6.62, p = .012, ηp
2= 0.06.
A three-way interaction, F(1, 100) = 7.78, p = .006, ηp
2= 0.07,
reflected that this expectancy illusion was only present in the
with-judgments group, F(1, 50) = 11.61, p = .001, ηp
2= 0.19,
but not in the without-judgments group, F(1, 50) = 0.03, p =
.861, ηp
2< 0.01.
Discussion
Despite minor changes in the procedure (i.e., presenting
the item first and then the source), we successfully repli-
cated the metamemory expectancy illusion—first discov-
ered by Schaper et al. (2019a)—in judgments of item and
source learning in Experiment 1. Participants predicted on
average better memory for both items and sources when
the item was presented with the expected source than when
the item was presented with the unexpected source. In stark
contrast to these metamemory predictions, source memory
was actually better for unexpected than for expected item–
source pairings in the without-judgment group. The source
memory advantage for unexpected information was only
present in the without-judgments group and absent in the
with-judgments group. Even though the direct comparison
between groups was not significant, the pattern of results is
consistent with the findings of Schaper et al. (2019a) at a
descriptive level. In the with-judgments group, the
metamemory expectancy illusion persisted in the
postdictions that were assessed after the memory test.
The without-judgments group showed no such effect.
This suggests that providing metamemory judgments dur-
ing encoding increased the conviction that expected infor-
mation improved memory. All of these results replicate
those of Schaper et al. (2019a). Having established the
robustness of these findings, the next aim is to test whether
the metamemory illusion generalizes from the nonsocial
domain to the social domain.
Experiment 2
To test whether the metamemory illusion observed in
Experiment 1 generalizes to a different stimulus domain,
we used a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game (Clark &
Sef ton, 2001) to pai r t rus twor thy- looking and
untrustworthy-looking faces with cheating and coopera-
tive behavior in Experiment 2. As in Experiment 1, the
item information (e.g., a trustworthy face) was associated
with either unexpected or expected source information
(cheating or cooperative behavior). As in Experiment 1,
we assessed participants metamemory in judgments of
item learning (Rhodes, 2016) and judgments of source
learning (Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016) after each round
of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In a subsequent memo-
ry test, we assessed how well participants remembered
the partners’ faces (item memory) and the associated
cheating or cooperative behavior (source memory).
After the memory test, participants were asked to pro-
vide postdictions for item and source memory in all four
cells of the design.
Table 1 Guessing parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals)
as a function of the item types (bathroom vs. kitchen) and judgment group
(without judgments vs. with judgments) in Experiment 1
Without judgments With judgments
Bathroom Kitchen Bathroom Kitchen
Parameter b
0.37 (0.34–0.41) 0.26 (0.22–0.29) 0.36 (0.31–0.41) 0.32 (0.28–0.37)
Parameter g
0.37 (0.30–0.45) 0.60 (0.51–0.69) 0.40 (0.30–0.49) 0.60 (0.50–0.70)
Note. Parameter b represents the probability of guessing that an item was
old. Parameter g represents the probability of guessing that an item was
placed in the kitchen rather than in the bathroom
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Method
Participants
We collected as much data as possible in the 6 weeks
the laboratory was available to us. A total of 185 par-
ticipants (124 female) took part in Experiment 2. They
were compensated with course credit or money. They
were alternatingly assigned to either the with-judgment
group (n = 92, 59 female) or without-judgment group (n
= 93, 65 female). Three additional data files had to be
excluded because of repeated participation. Age ranged
between 17 and 40 years (Mage = 23 years, SDage = 4
years). All participants gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
A sensitivity power analysis showed that with a sam-
ple size of 185 participants (>90 per group), 80 answers
per participant in the memory test, and given α = .05,
effect sizes of w = 0.04 could be detected in the model-
based comparisons with a statistical power of 1 − β =
.95. This power analysis was calculated using G*Power
(Faul et al., 2007).
Prisoner’s dilemma game
Participants played a one-shot sequential prisoner’s dilemma
game with 20 trustworthy-looking and 20 untrustworthy-
looking partners. For each participant, the faces of the partners
were drawn from a pool of 80 frontal facial photographs of
women with neutral facial expressions (250 × 375 pixels)
from the FERET database (Phillips, Wechsler, Huang, &
Rauss, 1998). Of these faces, 40 were trustworthy looking
and 40 were untrustworthy looking according to an indepen-
dent norming study with N = 21 students. The faces were
identical to those used in a previous study in which partici-
pants showed enhanced source memory for trustworthy-
looking cheaters (Mieth et al., 2016). Mean trustworthiness
ratings in the norming study on a scale ranging from 1 to 6
were M = 4.28 (SD = 0.23; min = 4.00; max = 4.86) for the
trustworthy-looking and M = 2.75, (SD = 0.24; min = 1.90;
max = 3.10) for the untrustworthy-looking faces. The faces
were randomly drawn from the pool of 80 faces and randomly
assigned to the conditions with the restriction that half of the
cheating partners and half of the cooperating partners looked
trustworthy, while the other half looked untrustworthy.
Fig. 4 Postdictions of item memory (a, c) and postdictions of source
memory (b, d) as a function of the item type (bathroom vs. kitchen)
and source type (in the kitchen vs. in the bathroom) in Experiment 1
(left panels) or as a function of the partner’s facial trustworthiness
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and partner’s behavior (cheating vs.
cooperation) in Experiment 2 (right panels). The error bars represent the
standard errors of the means
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The prisoner’s dilemma game was identical to that used in
previous studies (Bell et al., 2012; Bell, Giang, Mund, &
Buchner, 2013; Mieth et al., 2016). Participants were required
to invest money into a joint business venture with partners
whose faces were shown on the screen. Participants knew that
they played for real money (relative to an initial endowment of
100 cents, they could win or lose money depending on their
own and their partners’ decisions). In each trial, participants
were required to invest a small amount of money (30 or 15
cents). Cooperating partners always reciprocated the partici-
pants’ investment, which led to a small gain for both partners
(10 or 5 cents). Cheating partners invested nothing which led
to a comparatively large gain for the partner (20 or 10 cents) at
the expense of the participant who lost money (−10 or −5
cents).
A silhouette at the left side of the screen represented the
participant (see Fig. 5). At the right side of the screen, a pho-
tograph of the partner was shown. In each trial, participants
decided to invest either 15 or 30 cents by pressing a button on
a response box. The decision was displayed on screen for 500
ms. For 500 ms, the investment was shown in an arrow which
then moved to the center of the screen within an additional
500 ms. After 500 ms, the partner’s investment was shown in
an arrow for 500 ms, which also moved to the center of the
screen within 500 ms. After 500 ms, the sum of investments, a
bonus of one-third of the sum and the total sum were present-
ed in the center of the screen, each for 500 ms. After 500 ms,
the total sum was split evenly between the partners, regardless
of their previous investments. The partner’s share was shown
in an arrow andmoved toward the partner’s photograph (with-
in 500 ms). After 500 ms, the participant’s share was shown in
an arrow and moved toward the participant’s silhouette
(within 500 ms). After 1 s, both interactants’ gains and losses,
as well as the updated account balances (after 500 ms) were
shown below the photograph and the silhouette, respectively.
Participants gained money when interacting with cooperators,
and lost money when interacting with cheaters. The losses that
resulted from interactions with cheaters were as large as the
gains that resulted from interactions with cooperative partners.
A verbal description of the interaction was shown until the
participant pressed a continue button on the response box to
start the next trial. Two practice trials were provided to famil-
iarize the participants with the game.
Judgments of item and source learning
Participants in the without-judgment group performed the
prisoner’s dilemma game without providing metamemory
judgments, as in previous studies (Bell et al., 2012; Mieth
et al., 2016). Participants in the with-judgment group provided
metamemory judgments immediately after each round of the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Judgments were assessed as in
Experiment 1. First, participants were asked to predict the
probability that they would later remember the partner’s face
(judgment of item learning). Second, they were asked to pre-
dict the independent probability that they would later remem-
ber the partner’s behavior (judgment of source learning).
Source monitoring test
After the game phase, participants received instructions for a
standard source monitoring test (Bell et al., 2012; Mieth et al.,
2016). The 40 faces from the prisoner’s dilemma game were
randomly intermixed with 40 new faces from the same pool of
Fig. 5 A screenshot of the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Here,
both the participant and the partner cooperated and invested 30 cents
which results in a 10 cents gain for each of them. The partner’s
photograph shown in this example was taken from the Center for Vital
Longevity (CVL) face database (Minear & Park, 2004)
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faces. Twenty of the new faces were trustworthy looking and
20 were untrustworthy looking. All 80 faces were presented in
random order, one at a time, at the center of the screen. For
each face, participants first rated the likability of the face on a
scale ranging from 1 (not likable at all) to 6 (very likable).
Then participants were required to indicate whether they had
seen the face in the game before. If so, they were asked wheth-
er the face was paired with cheating or cooperation. By press-
ing the continue button, participants initiated the next trial.
Measuring source memory
The multinomial source monitoring model (Bayen et al.,
1996) was used to estimate parameters for item memory (D),
item guessing (b), source memory (d), and source guessing
(g). Here, Source A and Source B refer to cheating and coop-
eration in the prisoner’s dilemma game, respectively. Four
sets of the model in Fig. 1 were needed for the combinations
of faces (trustworthy looking and untrustworthy looking) and
the two judgment groups (without judgments and with
judgments).
Postdictions
After the memory test, participants provided postdictions
(Schaper et al., 2019a) for all four combinations of facial trust-
worthiness (trustworthy looking and untrustworthy looking) and
partner behavior (cheating and cooperation), as in Experiment 1.
Design
We used a 2 × 2 × 2 design with facial trustworthiness (trustwor-
thy vs. untrustworthy) and partner behavior (cheating vs. coop-
eration) as within-subject factors. Judgment group (without judg-
ments vs. with judgments) was again a between-subjects factor.
Dependent variables were judgments of item and source learning
averaged across items, objectivememory (item and sourcemem-
ory) and postdictions of item and source memory.
Results
Metamemory judgments and source monitoring processes
were analyzed as in Experiment 1. Additionally, investments
in the prisoner’s dilemma game and test-phase likeability rat-
ings were analyzed with repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Investments in the prisoner’s dilemma game and likability
ratings at test
Before focusing on metamemory and memory, it seems worth
noting that both game investments and test-phase likability
ratings sensitively reflected the manipulations of facial and
behavioral trustworthiness, as expected (see Table 2).
Participants invested more in the prisoner’s dilemma game
when interacting with trustworthy-looking partners than when
interacting with untrustworthy-looking partners, F(1, 183) =
142.84, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.44. At test, trustworthy-looking faces
were rated as being more likable than untrustworthy-looking
faces, F(1, 183) = 515.79, p < .001, ηp = 0.74, and cooperators
were rated as more likable than cheaters, F(1, 183) = 56.84, p
< .001, ηp
2= 0.24. Judgment group had no main effect on any
of these variables and did not interact with any other factor (all
Fs ≤ 3.35). These findings suggest that facial trustworthiness
and partner behavior were successfully manipulated, and
cheating and cooperative behavior had a significant influence
on the socioemotional evaluation of the partners.
Judgments of item and source learning
In the with-judgments group, judgments of item learning were
neither influenced by facial trustworthiness, F(1, 91) = 1.01, p
= .317, ηp
2= 0.01, nor by partner behavior, F(1, 91) = 1.27, p =
.263, ηp
2= 0.01. There was no interaction between facial trust-
worthiness and partner behavior, F(1, 91) = 0.53, p = .467,
ηp
2= 0.01 (see Fig. 2c).
For judgments of source learning, there were no main ef-
fects of facial trustworthiness, F(1, 91) = 2.04, p = .157, ηp
2=
0.02, and partner behavior, F(1, 91) = 1.16, p = .284, ηp
2=
0.01. However, critically, there was a significant interaction
between facial trustworthiness and partner behavior, F(1, 91)
= 25.69, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.22. On average, participants predict-
ed better source memory for trustworthy-looking cooperators
than for trustworthy-looking cheaters, F(1, 91) = 10.96, p =
.001, ηp
2= 0.11, and for untrustworthy-looking cheaters than
for untrustworthy-looking cooperators, F(1, 91) = 16.20, p <
.001, ηp
2= 0.15 (see Fig. 2d). Thus, in their metamemory
predictions participants expressed the belief that they would
have better source memory for expected behaviors.
Item and source memory
We used the same equality restrictions for the basemodel as in
Experiment 1. The base model fit the data well, G2(4) = 3.60,
p = .462, which suggests that the restriction that item memory
did not differ between cheater and cooperator faces (implied
by the base model) is compatible with the data (cf. Barclay &
Lalumière, 2006; Bell et al., 2012; Bell, Mieth, & Buchner,
2015; Mehl & Buchner, 2008; Mieth et al., 2016). However,
itemmemory was higher for untrustworthy-looking faces than
for trustworthy-looking faces, ΔG2(2) = 7.16 p = .028, w =
0.02 (see Fig. 3c). Furthermore, participants in the with-
judgments group had better item memory than participants
in the without-judgments group, ΔG2(2) = 57.17 p < .001,
w = 0.06. This suggests that the metacognitive processing
benefitted item memory, consistent with previous studies
(Rhodes, 2016; Schaper et al., (2019a).
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Source-memory parameter d represents the conditional
probability that participants remember the cheating or the co-
operation of a partner given that they have recognized the face
as old. As in Experiment 1, we further restricted the model by
using one parameter representing source memory for expected
item–source pairings (trustworthy-looking cooperators and
untrustworthy-looking cheaters) and one for unexpected
item–source pairings (trustworthy-looking cheaters and
untrustworthy-looking cooperators). The resulting model
was compatible with the data, G2(8) = 5.81, p = .669. This
new base model was used for the following analyses of the
source memory parameters. Source memory for expected and
unexpected source pairings differed significantly between
groups, ΔG2(2) = 9.85, p = .007, w = 0.03. In the without-
judgments group, participants showed an expectancy viola-
tion effect, replicating previous studies (Bell et al., 2012;
Mieth et al., 2016; Suzuki & Suga, 2010). Source memory
was better for unexpected than for expected item–source
pairings, ΔG2(1) = 9.24, p = .002, w = 0.02 (left side of Fig.
3d). As in Experiment 1, this expectancy-violation advantage
was not significant for participants who provided
metamemory judgments at encoding, ΔG2(1) = 1.05, p =
.306, w < 0.01 (right side of Fig. 3d).
Parameter g—which reflects the probability of guessing
that a face was associated with cheating—differed significant-
ly between trustworthy-looking faces and untrustworthy-
looking faces, independent of whether participants provided
metamemory judgments,ΔG2 (1) = 17.05, p < .001,w = 0.03,
or not, ΔG2(1) = 47.12, p < .001, w = 0.06 (see Table 3).
Participants in both groups guessed that trustworthy-looking
partners had been associated with cooperation and that
untrustworthy-looking partners had been associated with
cheating.
Postdictions of item and source memory
After the memory test, participants in both groups provided
postdictions for all four cells of the design. Postdictions for
item and source memory are shown in Figs. 4c–d. Participants
thought that they had remembered trustworthy-looking faces
better than untrustworthy-looking faces, F(1, 183) = 5.22, p =
.024, ηp
2= 0.03. They also thought that itemmemory had been
better for cheaters than for cooperators, F(1, 183) = 5.43, p =
.021, ηp
2= 0.03. These main effects were qualified by a sig-
nificant interaction, F(1, 183) = 6.46, p = .012, ηp
2= 0.03.
Participants thought that item memory had been better for
untrustworthy-looking cheaters than for untrustworthy-
looking cooperators, F(1, 183) = 12.64, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.06,
while no such difference was obtained for trustworthy-looking
faces, F(1, 183) = 0.04, p = .835, ηp
2< 0.01. There was neither
a main effect of judgment group nor any two-way or three-
way interactions with this variable (all Fs ≤ 0.20).
For the postdictions of source memory, there was no main
effect of facial trustworthiness, F(1, 183) = 1.93, p = .167,
ηp
2= 0.01. The main effect of partner behavior, in contrast,
was significant—participants thought they had remembered
cheating better than cooperative behavior, F(1, 183) = 18.36,
p < .001, ηp
2= 0.09. The interaction was not significant, F(1,
183) = 3.60, p = .059, ηp
2= 0.02. There was neither a main
effect of judgment group nor any two-way or three-way inter-
actions with this variable (all Fs ≤ 0.44).
Table 2 Means (and standard errors) for game investments and test-
phase likability ratings as a function of the partner’s facial trustworthiness
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), partner’s behavior (cheating vs.
cooperation), and judgment group (without-judgments vs. with-judg-
ments) in Experiment 2
Without judgments With judgments
Trustworthy Untrustworthy Trustworthy Untrustworthy
Game investments
22.13 (0.38) 18.42 (0.31) 21.73 (0.38) 18.67 (0.31)
Likability ratings
Cooperation 3.77 (0.07) 2.61 (0.06) 3.75 (0.07) 2.75 (0.06)
Cheating 3.59 (0.07) 2.46 (0.06) 3.51 (0.07) 2.44 (0.06)
Table 3 Guessing parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals)
as a function of the partners’ facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs.
untrustworthy) and judgment group (without judgments vs. with
judgments) in Experiment 2
Without judgments With judgments
Trustworthy Untrustworthy Trustworthy Untrustworthy
Parameter b
0.24 (0.21–0.26) 0.22 (0.19–0.24) 0.30 (0.27–0.33) 0.29 (0.26–0.32)
Parameter g
0.38 (0.31–0.44) 0.71 (0.64–0.77) 0.45 (0.38–0.52) 0.66 (0.59–0.73)
Note. Parameter b reflecting the probability of guessing that a face was
old. Parameter g representing the probability of guessing that the face of a
partner was associated with cheating rather than cooperation
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Discussion
Experiment 2 tested whether metamemory in source monitor-
ing with socially relevant materials follows the same princi-
ples as metamemory for nonsocial materials. Most notably,
Experiment 2 provided evidence of a metamemory expectan-
cy illusion in social source memory. Participants on average
predicted better source memory when the cheating or cooper-
ative behavior of the partner confirmed their expectations
about the trustworthy-looking or untrustworthy-looking per-
son. In stark contrast, veridical source memory was better for
unexpected behaviors than for expected behaviors in the
without-judgment group. A similar metamemory expectancy
illusion has been obtained in Experiment 1 and in other studies
(Schaper et al., 2019a, 2019b) with nonsocial stimulus mate-
rial. The present results demonstrate that people fall prey to
the samemetacognitive illusion evenwhenmaking judgments
about information that is socially relevant and associated with
real financial gains and losses. This suggests that
metamemory seems to be governed by similar principles for
social and nonsocial information.
Another parallel to the findings of Experiment 1 and
Schaper et al. (2019a) is that the source memory advantage
for unexpected information was reduced when participants
provided metamemory judgments after each encoding trial.
This is also consistent with the finding of Soderstrom et al.
(2015) that memory for related word pairs was selectively
increased when participants provided judgments of learning.
This finding thus strengthens the general conclusion that
memory for cheaters and cooperators is determined by the
same principles as memory for nonsocial information (Bell
& Buchner, 2012).
Postdictions about item and source memory assessed im-
mediately after test did not differ between the judgment
groups in Experiment 2. In contrast to the in-the-moment
judgments of source learning, source-memory postdictions
were characterized by a main effect of partner behavior, sug-
gesting that participants believed after test that they had re-
membered cheating better than cooperative behavior. The in-
teraction between facial trustworthiness and partner behavior
did not attain significance. This pattern of results is thus dif-
ferent from that obtained in Experiment 1. Other than the
judgments of source learning obtained at encoding, the
postdictions thus seem to differ between social and nonsocial
stimuli. A potential explanation for this difference between
postdictions and judgments of source learning obtained during
encoding is that postdictions—as global judgments—are
more reflective of the participants’ beliefs or naïve theories
about memory, whereas judgments of source learning during
encoding are more strongly determined by in-the-moment
processing experiences (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2017). In fact,
it seems plausible that people have different beliefs about
social memory versus nonsocial memory. This explanation
implies that people hold the belief that cheating is better re-
membered than cooperative behavior, which is plausible con-
sidering the salience of the negative experience of being
cheated. However, this assumption needs to be tested.
Experiment 3 therefore examines whether people hold the
belief that cheaters are better remembered than cooperators.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 investigated beliefs about memory for socially
relevant information. Global metamemory beliefs are often
assessed by using vignette descriptions of previous experi-
ments (e.g., Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014).
In an online survey, we described the prisoner’s dilemma
game used in Experiment 2 to the participants and asked them
to express their beliefs about item and source memory without
having experienced the game themselves.
Method
Participants
The final sample was based on N = 100 students (86 female)
of the University of Mannheim who participated in the online
study. Age ranged between 18 and 37 years (Mage = 21, SDage
= 3). Seven additional participants did not complete the study
and two additional data sets had to be removed because of
repeated participation. Only fluent German speakers were
allowed to participate.
Beliefs about item memory and source memory
First, participants read a description of the prisoner’s dilemma
game that was used in Experiment 2. It was made clear that the
partners in the game cooperated or cheated, and that they
looked trustworthy or untrustworthy. Then the source moni-
toring test was described. After that, the participants in
Experiment 3 were asked how well they believed the partici-
pants in the described study would remember the faces of their
partners (item memory) and the behaviors of these partners
(source memory). Separate judgments presented in random-
ized order were required for each cell of the 2 × 2 design of
Experiment 2 in which facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs.
untrustworthy) and partner behavior (cheating vs. coopera-
tion) were within-subject independent variables. For each of
these four combinations, participants first provided their item-
memory beliefs (e.g., “How likely was it that participants re-
membered the faces of trustworthy-looking people who
cheated in the game? [Remembering here only means that
participants remembered having seen the face; it does not
matter whether they also remembered the behavior correct-
ly.]”) and then their source-memory beliefs (e.g., “Staying
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with trustworthy looking cheaters: For what percentage of
those persons whose face participants recognized did they
correctly remember that they cheated in the game?”).
Participants then proceeded to the next trustworthiness-
behavior combination. As in Experiments 1 and 2, judgments
ranged between 0% and 100%.
Results
For item-memory beliefs, there was a main effect of partner
behavior, F(1, 99) = 23.21, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.19. Participants
thought that faces of cheaters would be better remembered
than faces of cooperators. Neither the main effect of facial
trustworthiness, F(1, 99) < 0.01, p = .928, ηp
2< 0.01, nor the
interaction, F(1, 99) = 0.85, p = .359, ηp
2< 0.01, were signif-
icant (Fig. 6a).
For source-memory beliefs, the main effect of partner be-
havior was significant as well, F(1, 99) = 16.12, p < .001, ηp
2=
0.14. Participants thought that a partner’s cheating would be
better remembered than a partner’s cooperation. There was no
main effect of facial trustworthiness, F(1, 99) < 0.01, p = .942,
ηp
2< 0.01. The interaction was not significant,F(1, 99) = 3.50,
p = .064, ηp
2= 0.03 (see Fig. 6b).
Discussion
As expected, source-memory beliefs obtained in Experiment 3
followed the same pattern as the source-memory postdictions
for social stimuli obtained in Experiment 2. Most importantly,
there was a significant main effect of partner behavior on the
global beliefs about source memory, reflecting the belief that
cheating is better remembered than cooperative behavior.
These results therefore suggest that the source-memory
postdictions in Experiment 2 could have been based on the
participants’ beliefs. This is in line with the previous sugges-
tion of Frank and Kuhlmann (2017) that postdictions, as ag-
gregated judgments about memory, strongly reflect global be-
liefs about memory. By contrast, however, item-memory be-
liefs did not show the same pattern as the item-memory
postdictions in Experiment 2. This may suggest that
postdictions about item memory are not only based on global
beliefs but are also, to some degree, modulated by experience-
based factors. However, note that the evidence linking the
global beliefs (assessed in Experiment 3) and the postdictions
(assessed in Experiment 2) is only indirect as it involves a
comparison across different experiments and samples.
General discussion
The present experiments provide evidence for a metamemory
illusion in people’s source-memory predictions for nonsocial
and social stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 2, we presented
information that either conformed or violated participants’
expectations. In Experiment 1, the to-be-remembered infor-
mation was nonsocial in nature. Participants saw items that
were either expected for a bathroom or a kitchen that were
placed in a kitchen or a bathroom context. In Experiment 2,
the to-be-remembered information was social in nature.
Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with
trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who
either cheated or cooperated. In both experiments, participants
Fig. 6 Global beliefs about item memory (a) and source memory (b) as a
function of the facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and
behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) in Experiment 3. The error bars
represent the standard errors of the means
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provided metamemory judgments about item and source
learning at encoding. Judgments of source learning consistent-
ly showed an expectancy illusion across experiments.
Participants predicted better source memory for expected
item–source pairings than for unexpected pairings. In
Experiment 1, participants predicted to have better source
memory for a typical kitchen item when it was placed in the
kitchen rather than in the bathroom. Similarly, in Experiment
2, participants predicted better memory for the behavior of an
untrustworthy-looking partner when the partner cheated than
when the partner cooperated. By contrast, in both experiments
veridical source memory was not in line with the expectations
in the with-judgments groups, and it was even better for un-
expected contexts in the without-judgment groups. The pres-
ent findings thus replicate the novel finding of a metamemory
expectancy illusion in judgments about source learning first
reported by Schaper et al. (2019a). Extending these previous
findings, we show for the first time that the metamemory
expectancy illusion can also be found to the social domain.
The fact that the metamemory illusion generalized across
experiments is particularly noteworthy when considering how
different the nonsocial stimuli and social stimuli were from
each other. Most noteworthy, the to-be-remembered cheating
and cooperating behavior of the partners in Experiment 2 had
real consequences for the participants in form of financial
gains and losses, which was not the case when participants
had to remember that, for example, an oven was presented in
the bathroom in Experiment 1. A priori, it was unclear wheth-
er people would have accurate metacognitive awareness when
the to-be-remembered information is socially and emotionally
relevant. The present study, however, demonstrates that peo-
ple have metacognitive misconceptions about their source
memory even in situations with high (self-)relevance.
The similarities across experiments suggest that
metamemory judgments about social and nonsocial
information are partly governed by the same principles.
Schaper et al. (2019a, 2019b) suggested that people rely on
processing fluency as a mnemonic cue for making judgments
of source learning. Specifically, information that is conceptu-
ally related and consistent with expectations is processedmore
fluently at encoding (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Undorf &
Erdfelder, 2011, 2013, 2015). Experiencing fluency at
encoding leads people to predict better memory performance.
Ironically, unexpected information is often processed more
thoroughly precisely because it violates one’s established
schematic and stereotypic expectations, which leads to higher
veridical memory for unexpected relative to expected source
information (Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; Küppers & Bayen,
2014). These mechanisms may be identical for social and
nonsocial information. This assumption is parsimonious as it
seems unnecessary to invoke different mechanisms to explain
the same pattern of findings across domains. From an evolu-
tionary point of view, it can be argued that relying on domain-
general cognitive machinery for problems whose structure is
identical across different domains may be more efficient than
using a plethora of separate but functionally identical modules
(Bell & Buchner, 2012). However, based on the present re-
sults, it cannot be completely ruled out that the underlying
processes differ across domains but have certain principles
in common.
The finding of a metamemory illusion in judgments about
adaptively relevant material raises the question of whether or
not metacognitive illusions are linked to maladaptive cogni-
tion and behavior.When it comes tometacognition, it has long
been recognized that introspective awareness of the rules
governing complex cognitive processes is not always neces-
sary to achieve satisfactory levels of performance. For exam-
ple, a baseball player may be perfectly able to catch a ball
without being able to reproduce the complex algorithms that
are necessary to predict where the ball will hit the ground
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). A lack of metacognitive aware-
ness thus does not necessarily represent evidence of a mal-
adapted system. Relying on schema-based guessing leads to a
high number of source errors in experiments in which a high
proportion of schematically unexpected information is pre-
sented, but these artificially determined contingencies may
not be representative of natural environments. In principle,
the simple strategy of using prior knowledge to get at source
attributions could be highly efficient in those environments
from which the schematic expectations have been derived
(Johnson et al., 1993). The metamemory illusion in the judg-
ments of source learning identified by Schaper and colleagues
(2019a)—that was replicated here—can be explained by as-
suming that people have no awareness of the relative contri-
butions of memory and guessing to their source attributions.
Pinpointing the exact circumstances under which this lack of
metacognitive awareness produces adaptive or maladaptive
consequences is an interesting avenue for future research.
Another parallel between Experiments 1 and 2 is the reac-
tivity of source memory to metamemory judgments. Source
memory was influenced by the provision of metamemory
judgments in the encoding phase. Memory for schematically
expected source information in particular benefitted from the
metamemory judgments, resulting in an attenuated expectan-
cy violation effect in veridical source memory. This finding
fits well with the observation that the requirement of having to
provide metamemory judgments selectively increases memo-
ry for related information in word-pair learning (Soderstrom
et al., 2015). A possible explanation for this finding is that
relatedness is used as a cue for judgments of source learning
which may cause attention to be drawn to the consistency
between the items and the sources. The requirement to give
metamemory judgments may therefore strengthenmemory for
expected information. In line with this explanation, Schaper
et al. (2019a) found that the attenuation of the expectancy-
violation effect could be traced back to providing judgments
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of source learning, but not to providing judgments of item
learning. Thus, in our experiments, a comparatively subtle
manipulation oriented attention to expected information and
diminished the source memory advantage for unexpected
item–source pairings. Thereby, our results further corroborate
that a memory advantage for trustworthy-looking cheaters is
most likely not caused by a highly specialized cheater-
detection module (Suzuki, Honma, & Suga, 2013; Suzuki &
Suga, 2010) but is rather based on flexible memory-and-
attention mechanisms (Bell & Buchner, 2012; Bell et al.,
2015). Specifically, due to the salience of unexpected infor-
mation, people may allocate more attention to unexpected
item–source pairings, but this bias is eliminated when
metamemory instructions direct attention in the opposite
direction.
Even though most of the results of Experiment 1 were
replicated in Experiment 2, there were also some notice-
able differences. First, an expectancy illusion in the judg-
ments of source learning was obtained in both experiments,
but it was less pronounced in Experiment 2 than in
Experiment 1. These differences in the absolute size of
the effect are difficult to interpret due to the methodolog-
ical differences between the experiments, but they suggest
that the factors underlying the expectancy illusion may
differ in strength between the experiments. Secondly, only
judgments of source learning showed an expectancy illu-
sion in both experiments while the judgments of item
learning differed between experiments. Specifically, there
was an expectancy illusion in the judgments of item learn-
ing in Experiment 1, but this pattern was not replicated in
Experiment 2. This strengthens the conclusion of Schaper
et al. (2019a) that judgments of item learning differ from
judgments of source learning. The finding suggests that the
metamemory judgments of item learning are less affected
by the encoding context when they refer to faces than when
they refer to words. Despite this obvious difference in the
pattern of results between the experiments, it seems notice-
able that the expectancy illusion was stronger in the judg-
ments of source learning than in the judgments of item
learning in Experiment 1 as well. When analyzing the
judgments of learning in a 2 × 2 × 2 analysis with item
types (bathroom items vs. kitchen items), source type (in
the kitchen vs. in the bathroom) and judgment type (judge-
ment of item learning vs. judgment of source learning) as
within-subjects variables, a significant three-way interac-
tion was revealed, F(1, 59) = 45.96, p < .001, ηp
2= 0.44.
This result confirms the finding of Schaper et al. (2019a)
that the expectancy illusion is generally stronger in the
judgments of source learning than in the judgments of item
learning.
Another interesting difference between the results of
the first two experiments is that the postdictions differed
across experiments. A potential explanation for this
pattern of finding is that postdictions, as global judg-
ments, are more strongly affected by the participants’
beliefs. There is little reason to assume that people hold
the same beliefs about the factors that determine their
social and nonsocial memory. Indeed, Experiment 3
shows that people hold the belief that cheaters are par-
ticularly memorable. This is different to the nonsocial
domain in which participants expressed the belief that
expected information is better remembered than unex-
pected information (Schaper et al., 2019b). To the degree
that metacognitive judgments are affected by these be-
liefs, differences between judgments about social infor-
mation and judgments about nonsocial information are to
be expected. Interestingly, the judgments of source learn-
ing obtained at encoding in Experiment 2 were charac-
terized by an expectancy illusion, with no main effect of
partner behavior. The judgments of learning thus did not
reflect the global belief that cheating is remembered bet-
ter than cooperation. This pattern of results may suggest
that the judgments of source learning were not strongly
determined by participants’ global beliefs, but rather—at
least to some degree—by the participants’ in-the-moment
experiences in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
In sum, the present study replicates and extends previous
studies on metamemory (Schaper et al., 2019a; Undorf &
Erdfelder, 2015) by examining metamemory judgments for
nonsocial information (expected or unexpected items in the
kitchen and the bathroom) and socially relevant information
(other people’s faces and behaviors). We found that people are
prone to a metamemory illusion in source memory in that they
tend to predict enhanced source memory for bathroom and
kitchen items in expected rooms (Experiment 1) and social
behaviors that are consistent with stereotypic expectations
(Experiment 2). Further, without encountering social partners,
people seem to hold the general belief that cheating is better
remembered than cooperation (Experiment 3). In contrast to
these metamemory judgments, objective source memory is
usually enhanced for unexpected information (Bell &
Buchner, 2012). This replicates the novel finding of a
metamemory illusion in judgments of source learning
(Schaper et al., 2019a). Extending previous research, the pres-
ent study shows that this metamemory illusion generalizes to
the social domain. Not only is memory for cheaters deter-
mined by general principles (Bell & Buchner, 2012; Bell
et al., 2015), the present results suggest that the same conclu-
sion does—at least to some degree—apply to metamemory as
well.
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